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The majority of global energy scenarios anticipate a structural break in the relationship between energy con
sumption and gross domestic product (GDP), with several scenarios projecting absolute decoupling, where en
ergy use falls while GDP continues to grow. However, there are few precedents for absolute decoupling, and
current global trends are in the opposite direction. This paper explores one possible explanation for the historical
close relationship between energy consumption and GDP, namely that the economy-wide rebound effects from
improved energy efficiency are larger than is commonly assumed. We review the evidence on the size of
economy-wide rebound effects and explore whether and how such effects are taken into account within the
models used to produce global energy scenarios. We find the evidence base to be growing in size and quality, but
remarkably diverse in terms of the methodologies employed, assumptions used, and rebound mechanisms
included. Despite this diversity, the results are broadly consistent and suggest that economy-wide rebound effects
may erode more than half of the expected energy savings from improved energy efficiency. We also find that
many of the mechanisms driving rebound effects are overlooked by integrated assessment and global energy
models. We therefore conclude that global energy scenarios may underestimate the future rate of growth of
global energy demand.

1. Introduction
1.1. Background: the important role of energy efficiency, and the threat of
rebound
Improved energy efficiency is expected to play a central role in
meeting both the goals of the Paris Agreement [1] and the Sustainable
Development Goals [2], contributing up to 40% of the envisaged re
ductions in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the next two
decades [3,4]. However, whilst energy efficiency is firmly embedded as
a key mitigation strategy within Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs)
[5], there are few signs that the rate of growth of global energy demand
is slowing. Indeed, after nine years of slower global economic growth

following the 2008 global recession, global primary energy consumption
increased by 2.1%/year in 2017 and 2.3%/year in 2018 [6], close to the
average of ~2.4%/year over the last 250 years [7]. Between 1971 and
2018, global GDP (in US$2010 constant prices) grew by an average of
3.1%/year [8] while global primary and final energy consumption
increased by an average of 2.0%/year and 1.8%/year, respectively [9].
This is relative decoupling, since energy consumption grew more slowly
than GDP, but there is no historical global experience of absolute
decoupling, where energy use falls while GDP continues to grow.
There is some experience of absolute decoupling at the national
level, but only for a limited number of countries (e.g., the UK and
Denmark) for relatively short periods of time [10,11]. These examples of
absolute decoupling have been partly achieved by ‘offshoring’ domestic
manufacturing to other countries [12,13]. In their analysis of 99
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Nomenclature

WEO

Abbreviations/Acronyms
AEEI
autonomous energy efficiency improvements
AIM
Asia-Pacific Integrated Model
CES
Constant Elasticity of Substitution
CGE
Computable General Equilibrium
GCAM
Global Change Analysis Model
GDP
gross domestic product
GHG
Greenhouse Gas
GLOBIOM Global Biosphere Management Model
IAM
Integrated Assessment Model
IEA
International Energy Agency
IMAGE Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment
IPCC
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRENA
International Renewable Energy Agency
MAgPIE Model of Agricultural Production and its Impact on the
Environment
MER
Market Exchange Rate
MESSAGE Model of Energy Supply Systems And their General
Environmental Impact
PIEEI
Price Induced Energy Efficiency Improvements
PPP
Purchasing Power Parity
REMIND Regional Model of Investments and Development
SSP
Shared Socioeconomic Pathway
USEIA
US Energy Information Administration
WEM
World Energy Model

Symbols (and Units)
EP
Primary energy use (measured in e.g., Joules/year)
E/Y
Energy intensity (measured in e.g., $Joule/US)
Y
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross Output (measured in
e.g., $US/year)
θE
Energy efficiency (Y/E) in economic terms (measured in e.
g., $US/Joule)
K
Capital stock (measured in e.g., $US/year)
L
Labour inputs (measured in e.g., work hours/year or
number of workers/year)
E
Energy inputs (measured in e.g., Joules/year)
M
Materials inputs (measured in e.g., tonnes/year)
U
useful exergy output (measured in e.g., Joules/year)
X
primary exergy input (measured in e.g., Joules/year)
It
Aggregate energy intensity (Et /Yt ) at time t (measured in e.
g., $US/Joule)
At
total factor productivity, at time t (dimensionless)
λ
‘factor neutral’ technical change (dimensionless)
π
‘capital-augmenting’ technical change (dimensionless)
ρ
‘labour–augmenting’ technical change (dimensionless)
τ
Energy-augmenting technical change (dimensionless)
υ
‘materials-augmenting’ technical change (dimensionless)
ε
primary-to-useful exergy efficiency (ratio, dimensionless)
time at initial period, 0
t0
t1
time at subsequent period, 1

countries over the period 1971–2010, Csereklyei et al. [10,14] find
relatively stable cross-sectional relationships between per-capita pri
mary energy use (EP) and per-capita constant GDP (Y) exchanged at
purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, with an elasticity (of EP with
respect to Y) of ~0.7. This relationship implies that richer countries are
less energy intensive and that, on average, a 1% increase in per-capita
income is associated with a 0.3% decrease in per-capita primary en
ergy intensity (EP/Y). Semieniuk et al. [15] analysed 185 countries over
the period 1950–2014 and found an even stronger correlation (Spear
man’s rank coefficient of 0.86) between per-capita primary energy use
and per-capita (PPP) GDP, with an elasticity of 0.89 for most of the
sample.
In this context, the global energy scenarios from the International
Energy Agency (IEA) [4], the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) [16], and other organisations represent a significant
departure from the historical trend. These scenarios commonly project
low or no growth in energy demand over the next few decades, due to a
combination of structural change and the more rapid uptake of energy
efficient technologies [15]. Energy demand in lower-income regions is
projected to grow slowly, despite the need for large-scale investment in
infrastructure and heavy industry [17,18], and in many scenarios this
increase is more than offset by reductions in energy demand in
high-income regions. For example, a review of 2 ◦ C scenarios from three
IAMs (TIAM-Grantham, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, and WITCH) found
average changes in global final energy demand of between +0.2%/year
and − 0.9%/year in the period from 2020 to 2050 [5]. The top end of this
range (+0.2%/year) is only a tenth of the average rate of increase since
1971, while (given the assumption of economic growth continuing at
2–3%/year [19]) the bottom end of the range (− 0.9%/year) represents
significant levels of absolute decoupling.
Most scenarios also project an immediate acceleration in the rate of
decoupling, but there is little evidence that such an acceleration is un
derway. Indeed, global primary energy intensity fell by only 1.3%/year
in 2018, the lowest annual fall for a decade, and the fourth year in a row
that the rate of improvement has declined [20]. The common response

World Energy Outlook

to this slow rate of progress is to call for rapid implementation of more
ambitious energy efficiency policies [20]. However, given that manda
tory energy efficiency polices already cover 35% of global final energy
use in 2018 [20], it is not certain that a step change in energy efficiency
policies would deliver the envisaged reduction in energy consumption.
A failure to achieve the anticipated structural break in the rate of
growth of global energy demand could have important consequences. If
greater decoupling of energy consumption from GDP is not achieved, it
will be necessary to rely more heavily on low-carbon energy supply,
carbon capture and storage, and negative emission technologies to meet
the Paris Agreement goals. These strategies require ambitious policies,
large-scale investment, extensive land use, and significant lead-times –
so expanding them further will be politically challenging and will take
time to have an effect. Hence, further investigation of the prospects for
absolute decoupling, and the possible obstacles to that decoupling, is
warranted.
This paper explores one possible explanation for the historical
close coupling between energy consumption and GDP, namely that
economy-wide rebound effects from improved energy efficiency are larger
than is commonly assumed. We use the term ‘rebound effects’ to refer to
a variety of behavioural and economic responses to improved energy
efficiency, whose net result is to reduce energy savings relative to a
counterfactual scenario in which those responses do not occur [21]. If
rebound effects are large, absolute decoupling will be more difficult to
achieve [22]. Whilst energy rebound research was historically driven by
a focus on the energy supply and economic implications of improved
energy efficiency [23–25], added recent impetus has been given by the
implications for climate change and climate policies [26,27]. We review
the evidence on the size of economy-wide rebound effects and explore
whether and how such effects are taken into account within the models
used to produce global energy scenarios. We argue that: first, the evi
dence suggests economy-wide rebound effects may erode more than half
of the potential energy savings from improved energy efficiency; second,
the models used by the IPCC and others take insufficient account of these
rebound effects; and third, the resulting scenarios may therefore
2
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underestimate the future rate of growth of global energy demand.

primary energy – which become more important as non-fossil sources
form a larger share of the global energy mix [28,29].2
For historical trends over the period 1971–2018, we take global final
energy consumption data (in TJ/year) from the IEA’s Extended World
Energy Balances [9], and historical GDP data (Market Exchange Rate
[MER] in US$2010 constant prices) from the World Bank [8]. For pro
jections over the period 2018 to 2050, we take eight scenarios from the
IPCC and nine scenarios from other authoritative sources (some sce
narios have an end year of 2040).
From the IPCC, we take four scenarios that limit warming to 1.5 ◦ C
by 2100 with a >50% probability, and four that meet the 2.0 ◦ C target
with >66% probability [30–32]. These scenarios are derived from a
number of IAMs and assume different levels of population [33] and
different patterns of demographic, political, and economic development
-via alternative Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) [34].3 They also
lead to different atmospheric concentrations of GHGs - the IPCC’s
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). In addition, we take
global energy scenarios from the IEA [4,35,36], the International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) [37], Greenpeace [38], the US En
ergy Information Administration (USEIA) [39], bp [40], and Shell [41].
These scenarios are derived from a variety of global energy models and
represent a range of outcomes for global average temperature.
We align the GDP projections in these scenarios to our historical data
via constant MER values in $US2010 prices4 and the final energy con
sumption projections to our historical data in TJ. Table 1 summarises the
different scenarios, Fig. 1 presents the historical and projected trends in
global final energy consumption and GDP, and Fig. 2 indicates the
corresponding changes in global final energy intensity.
The structural break in energy-GDP relationships in many of the
model scenarios can be seen in Fig. 1 (final energy demand) and Fig. 2
(annual change of final energy intensity). In 9 of the 15 scenarios, final
energy intensity (EF/Y) falls by more than 2.4%/year every year be
tween 2020 and 2030 (Table 1) - more than double the average rate of
decline since 1971 (1.2%/year). Nearly all the scenarios imply a struc
tural break in energy-GDP relationships, but the size of this break de
pends upon the level of ambition of the scenario, the structure of the
model, and the assumptions for key parameters and variables.
Three other notable features are apparent. First, as climate targets
tighten, the scenarios tend towards absolute decoupling of final energy
consumption from GDP. For example, the mean rate of growth of final
energy consumption in the IPCC 1.5 ◦ C scenarios is +0.0%/year, while
that in the 2.0 ◦ C scenarios is +0.9%/year – which is still only half the
average rate of growth since 1971 (+1.8%/year). Second, the annual
reductions in global final energy intensity (Table 1) vary from − 1.1%/
year to − 5.2%/year. The IPCC scenarios exhibit the largest reductions
(− 3.1%/year) versus the other scenarios (− 2.0%/year) in the
2020–2030 decade, and these are 2–3 times the average rate of decline
in the preceding decade (− 0.8%/year). Third, in the period 2020–2030,

1.2. Review outline
There are five elements to this Review (Sections 2–6), leading to the
Discussion and Conclusions (Sections 7 and 8). The starting point is
Section 2, which compares the historical trend (1971–2018) in global
final energy consumption with those projected by 17 selected global
energy scenarios (2018–2050). The aim is to establish the historical
relationship between final energy consumption and GDP and to identify
how this is projected to change in the selected scenarios. We find that
many scenarios project a significant break in the relationship between
energy use and GDP - thereby raising questions about their plausibility
[15]. The remaining sections investigate whether large, economy-wide
rebound effects could help explain the historical linkage between en
ergy use and GDP and hence whether these effects could obstruct any
future decoupling. Section 3 presents the different definitions of
improved energy efficiency, and describes how different types of
rebound effects may erode the anticipated energy savings. We clarify the
mechanisms contributing to direct, indirect, and macroeconomic
rebound effects and show how these combine to create an overall
economy-wide rebound effect.
Sections 4 and 5 review the empirical evidence on the size of these
economy-wide rebound effects. Section 4 summarises the results from
21 studies that use computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to
estimate rebound effects, while Section 5 summarises the results from 12
studies that use a range of other methods. The selected studies were
identified from keyword searches in Google Scholar, using the criteria
that: a) they estimate rebound effects at the economy-wide level; and b)
they explicitly or implicitly include one or more macroeconomic
rebound effects. While this is a narrative review rather than a systematic
review of the type by Sorrell [21], we include a broad selection of studies
in this area,1 which serves to give a representative sample of reported
rebound magnitudes, from studies with a broad range of methods and
assumptions.
Sections 4 and 5 demonstrate that the majority of empirical studies
estimate economy wide rebound effects of 50% or more, suggesting that
at least half of the potential energy savings from improved energy effi
ciency may be ‘taken back’ by various economic and behavioural re
sponses. Section 6 then examines whether and how the mechanisms
contributing to these rebound effects are included in the integrated
assessment and global energy models used to produce global energy
scenarios (seen in Section 2). We demonstrate that the majority of
models only include a subset of these mechanisms, thereby creating the
risk that they underestimate the size and importance of economy-wide
rebound effects.
Section 7 discusses the extent to which the omission of some or all of
these mechanisms could lead to over-optimistic projections of the future
decoupling of energy consumption from GDP. Finally, Section 8 con
cludes by highlighting some of the implications for research and energy
modelling.

2
Appendix A repeats the analysis for primary energy use and GDP, and finds
very similar patterns.
3
The baseline scenarios for the five SSPs describes future developments in
the absence of new climate policy. These broadly correspond to: a) sustain
ability focused growth and equity (SSP1); b) continuation of historical trends
(SSP2); c) fragmented world of resurgent nationalism (SSP3); d) increasing
inequality (SSP4); and d) rapid and unconstrained growth in economic output
and energy use (SSP5).
4
Conversion of PPP growth rates to MER growth rates via factor of 0.78, i.e.
MER growth rate = 0.78 x PPP growth rate. 0.78 factor chosen based on two
sources: 1. World Bank 2010$US constant MER growth rate 2000-2018 =
2.86% / IEA PPP 2018$US constant PPP growth rate 2000-2018 = 3.70%
(Table B2, WEO 2019); and 2. World gross domestic product (GDP) annual
growth rates calculated from EIA International Energy Outlook 2019 for 20182050 on MER basis (2.40%) and PPP basis (3.00%), https://www.eia.
gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=4-IEO2019&cases=Ref
erence&sourcekey=0

2. Structural breaks in global final energy demand
To establish the nature and scale of the anticipated structural break
between historical trends and future projections of global final energy
consumption, we collate and compare data from a range of sources. We
focus upon final rather than primary energy consumption since this
avoids the difficulties created by different conventions for measuring
1

The evidence base is currently both too small (n = 33) and too methodo
logically diverse for a meta-analysis to be applied, but this remains a possibility
for the future.
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Table 1
Projected change in global final energy intensity in a selection of global energy scenarios.
Scenario type

Climate outcome

Model and documentation

Model Scenario

Average annual change in final energy intensity (%)

IPCC scenarios

~1.5 ◦ C

IMAGE [42]
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM [19]
REMIND-MAgPIE [43]
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM [19]

SSP1-1.9 (sustainability) [31]
SSP2-1.9 (middle-of-the-road) [31]
SSP5-1.9 (fossil fuel) [31]
IIASA Low Energy Demand [31]

−
−
−
−

5.3%
2.8%
2.6%
5.2%

−
−
−
−

2.6%
2.1%
3.4%
3.7%

−
−
−
−

1.2%
1.3%
1.9%
2.6%

~2.0 ◦ C

IMAGE [42]
MESSAGE-GLOBIOM [19]
GCAM [44]
REMIND-MAgPIE [43]

SSP1-2.6
SSP2-2.6
SSP4-2.6
SSP5-2.6

−
−
−
−

2.9%
1.8%
2.1%
1.9%

−
−
−
−

2.4%
1.5%
1.4%
2.6%

−
−
−
−

1.8%
1.3%
1.1%
1.9%

¡3.1%

¡2.5%

¡1.6%

~1.5 ◦ C

IEA World Energy Model [45]

Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) [35]

− 2.5%

− 2.7%

− 2.7%

~2.0 ◦ C

IEA World Energy Model [45]
IRENA – N/A
Shell World Energy Model [46]
BP Energy Outlook model [47]
Mesap PLaNet model [48]

Efficient World Scenario (EWS) [20]
Renewable Energy Roadmap [37]
Shell Sky Scenario [41]
Rapid transition scenario [40]
Greenpeace World Energy [r]evolution [38]

− 2.5%
− 2.6%
− 1.6%
N/a
− 2.8%

− 2.2%
− 2.2%
− 1.3%
N/a
− 3.5%

− 2.2%
− 2.6%
− 1.1%
N/a
− 2.8%

>2.0 ◦ C

IEA World Energy Model [45]
IEA World Energy Model [45]
EIA World Energy Projection System Plus [49].

Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) [35]
Current Policies Scenario (CPS) [4]
EIA Mid GDP, mid oil price scenario [39]

− 1.2%
− 1.2%
N/a

− 1.5%
− 1.2%
N/a

− 1.5%
− 1.2%
N/a

¡2.0%

¡2.1%

¡2.0%

2020–2030

(sustainability) [31]
(middle-of-the-road) [31]
(regional rivalry) [31]
(fossil fuel) [31]

IPCC model average

4

Other scenarios

2040–2050

Notes.
1. Global final energy intensity fell by an average of − 1.2%/year over the period 1971–2018, and by − 0.9%year over the period 2008–2018.
2. The IPCC 1.5 ◦ C Special report [50] uses the AIM model scenario for SSP1-1.9. However, we take the IMAGE SSP1-1.9 scenario for consistency with the previous IMAGE SSP1-2.6 scenario, and to better enable
comparison of energy projections moving from RCP-2.6 to RCP-1.9.
3. GCAM is the marker model for SSP4-2.6 scenario, but does not have a SSP4-1.9 scenario. In its place, for our fourth 1.5 ◦ C scenario, we choose to include the MESSAGE-GLOBIOM IIASA Low Energy Demand scenario.
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Other scenarios average

2030–2040
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Fig. 1. Historical trends and future scenarios for global final energy use and GDP (1971–2050). Notes: Scenario plots are in four groups: orange (IEA models); green
(1.5 ◦ C IAMs); purple (2.0 ◦ C IAMs) and blue (other models). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web
version of this article.)

the rate of decline in energy intensity in the IPCC 1.5 ◦ C scenarios
(− 4.0%/year) is nearly twice that observed in the 2.0 ◦ C scenarios
(− 2.2%/year).5
In summary, the structural break observed in many of these scenarios
represents a radical departure from the historical trend, both in the rate
of growth of final energy consumption and the rate of decline of final
energy intensity. The plausibility of this structural break therefore de
serves closer attention.

3.1. Defining and modelling improved energy efficiency
Energy efficiency is simply the ratio of useful outputs to energy in
puts for a specified system – such as a motor, a machine tool, an in
dustrial process, a firm, a sector, or an entire economy. Depending upon
the system and the purpose at hand, inputs and outputs may be
measured in energy terms, such as heat content or physical work;
physical terms, such as vehicle kilometres or tonnes of steel; or economic
terms such as value-added or GDP [51]. Energy intensity is the inverse of
energy efficiency and is most commonly measured in economic terms.
Different energy efficiency measures may be more or less appropriate for
different systems and purposes.
Empirical and modelling studies relating to energy efficiency im
provements vary in terms of:

3. Improved energy efficiency and economy-wide rebound
effects
The decoupling in the above scenarios is largely the projected result
of improved energy efficiency throughout all sectors of the global
economy. The scenarios include different types, sources, sizes, and costs
of energy efficiency improvement, but these improvements may lead to
variety of rebound effects, which may not always be captured by the
relevant models. Hence, it is first necessary to define what ‘improved
energy efficiency’ means and how it is commonly modelled, and then to
clarify how rebound effects can erode the associated energy savings.

1. how they define the numerator and denominator of relevant energy
efficiency measures (e.g. first law thermodynamic, second law
thermodynamic, physical, economic);
2. the system boundaries to which these definitions apply (e.g. devices,
households, firms, sectors, national economies);
3. the methods used to aggregate different energy types (i.e. whether
and how differences in energy quality are accounted for [52];
4. the source of improvements in energy efficiency (e.g. exogenous
technical change, price-induced substitution, mandatory standards);
5. the cost of achieving those improvements (e.g. zero-cost technical
change, high-cost regulatory standards [53]; and
6. whether those improvements control for (or are assumed to be in
dependent of) improvements in the productivity of other inputs, or
increases in the utility obtained from other commodities.

5
The same relationship would hold between per capita energy consumption
and per capita GDP – as demonstrated by Semieniuk et al. [15]. The largest
disconnect is observed in the near term (2020–2030), when the rate of popu
lation growth should be close to that during the last decade.

5

P.E. Brockway et al.

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 141 (2021) 110781

Fig. 2. Historical trends and future scenarios for annual change in final energy intensity (1971–2050). Notes: Annual percentage change in global final energy
intensity (plotted annually for the historical trend, and as a decadal average for each scenario). Black dotted line is linear regression/projection of historical trends.
The scenario plots are in four groups: orange (IEA models); green (1.5 ◦ C IAMs); purple (2.0 ◦ C IAMs) and blue (other models). (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)

Many aggregate economic models simulate the behaviour of an
economy by a production function of the form: Y = λf(πK, ρL, τE, υM);
where Y is gross output, K is capital inputs, L is labour inputs, E is energy
inputs, M is material inputs, and λ, π, ρ, τ and υ are exogenous, timedependent multipliers representing ‘factor neutral’, ‘capital-augment
ing’, ‘labour–augmenting’, ‘energy-augmenting’ and ‘materials-aug
menting’ technical change respectively. Technical change is assumed to
improve the productivity6 of individual inputs over time (e.g.,τt1 > τt0
for t1 > t0 ) independently of changes in relative prices. Hence, energyaugmenting technical change should improve aggregate economicbased energy efficiency (θE = Y/E), because less energy is required to
produce the same level of economic output. Increases in the relative
price of energy should also improve aggregate energy efficiency,
because this encourages producers to substitute other inputs for energy –
but since costs have increased, output may fall. In contrast, technical
change improves energy productivity independently of changes in
relative prices and without reducing output.7
Energy-augmenting technical change (τ) is one way of simulating
improved energy efficiency, but this is not directly observed and hence is

difficult to measure empirically [54]. In contrast, it is straightforward to
measure the aggregate economic-based energy efficiency of a sector
(θE = Y/E), but this depends upon the level and price of each input, the
current state of technology, and the level of output, as well as upon how
individual inputs are measured and aggregated. In addition, a one-off or
ongoing improvement in the productivity of energy inputs (τ) will lower
the price of ‘effective energy’ (τE) and hence encourage producers to
substitute (effective) energy for other inputs – which is one of the
mechanisms contributing to the rebound effect [55]. As a result, a 1%
improvement in the productivity of energy inputs (τ) within a firm,
sector or economy may not translate to a 1% improvement in the
aggregate energy efficiency (θE ) of that firm, sector, or economy [56].
Also, changes in aggregate energy efficiency may result from changes in
the level, price, and productivity of non-energy inputs, even in the
absence of energy-augmenting technical change [56]. Similarly, im
provements in energy efficiency at one level of aggregation (e.g., an
industrial sector) may not translate to improvements in energy effi
ciency at a higher level of aggregation (e.g., a national economy) owing
to a variety of macroeconomic adjustments – for example, a shift to
wards more energy intensive goods and services as a consequence of a
fall in their relative price. More generally there is no necessary link
between improvements in one measure of energy efficiency (e.g., τ) and
improvements in another measure (e.g., θE ) at either the same or
different levels of aggregation. Since different studies define and mea
sure energy efficiency improvements in different ways and for different
levels of aggregation, great care must be taken when comparing and
interpreting their results.

6
We define ‘productivity’ in this context as the level of economic output per
unit of energy (or labour, capital or materials) input.
7
Substitution is represented in neoclassical economic theory as movement
along an isoquant of a production function and technical change as a shift of the
isoquant [55]. However, the distinction between the two is less clear from an
engineering perspective: changes in prices may themselves induce technical
change; and both technical change and substitution may reflect a complex mix
of investment, operational changes and shifts in the composition of output.
Classical economic growth theory does not distinguish substitution movements
from technical change [130].
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3.2. Economy-wide rebound effects

4. Estimates of economy-wide rebound effects from computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models

Cost-effective energy efficiency improvements reduce the effective
price of energy services, such as heating and lighting, and hence
encourage increased consumption of those services, which in turn will
partly offset the energy savings per unit of the energy service. This direct
rebound effect is well established and is now the subject of a large and
growing empirical literature [21,57–59], especially for efficiency im
provements by consumers. However, energy efficiency improvements
can also trigger indirect and macroeconomic responses and associated
rebound effects [59], with consequent impacts on energy consumption
throughout the economy (see Appendix B for a summary of the different
components of the direct, indirect and macroeconomic rebound effects).
For example, the savings in gasoline consumption from using fuelefficient cars may be spent on other goods and services that also
require energy to manufacture and use (indirect rebound). Similarly, the
widespread adoption of energy efficient cars may reduce gasoline de
mand and hence gasoline prices, that will in turn encourage increased
consumption of gasoline and other energy (macroeconomic rebound)
and have secondary impacts in other markets. Both direct and indirect
rebound effects are partial equilibrium, since the methodologies
employed to estimate them (e.g., input-output models) hold input and
commodity prices fixed throughout the economy, and only consider
variations in the effective price of the energy service itself. In contrast,
the macroeconomic rebound effects are general equilibrium, since the
methodologies employed to estimate them (e.g., computable general
equilibrium models) allow input and commodity prices to vary
throughout the economy. In practice, these different effects occur
simultaneously and their net result - the economy-wide rebound effect – is
normally expressed as a percentage of the expected economy-wide en
ergy savings, as estimated from a counterfactual scenario where none of
these adjustments occur [60,61].
Economy-wide rebound effects are challenging to estimate, but there
is growing evidence to suggest they may be large. For example, Saunders
[26] uses data over the period 1850–2000 to estimate economy-wide
rebound effects in excess of 60% for Sweden, whilst Bruns et al. [62]
uses data over the period 1973–2016 to estimate rebound effects of
~100% for the US (both of these studies are reviewed below). Sugges
tive evidence is also provided by van Benthem [22] who finds that
economic growth in developing countries is as energy-intensive as past
growth in industrialized countries, despite dramatic improvements in
the energy efficiency of individual technologies. The equality in energy
intensity suggests that the energy savings from improvements in indi
vidual technologies have been offset by other trends, such as a shift
toward more energy-intensive patterns of consumption [10,22]. Simi
larly, Csereklyei et al. [10] show that the long-term decline in regional
and global energy intensity is due to countries getting richer, rather from
them producing particular levels of wealth with less energy.
The following two sections review some recent estimates of the
magnitude of economy-wide rebound effects, including both ex-ante
estimates from macroeconomic models and ex-post estimates from his
torical data. The selected studies were identified from keyword searches
in Google Scholar, using the criteria that: a) the studies estimate
rebound effects at the economy-wide level; and b) they explicitly or
implicitly include one or more of the macroeconomic effects listed in
Appendix B. Thus, for example, we exclude studies that focus upon in
dividual energy services [63], or upon individual economic sectors [64],
as well as those that rely solely upon input-output models (e.g.,
[65–69]), because the latter neglect macroeconomic rebound effects.
While the resulting sample is not fully comprehensive, it provides a
representative coverage of the available evidence and includes the most
highly cited studies in this area.
We split the evidence into two groups: estimates from computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models (Section 4) and estimates from other
methodologies (Section 5).

The most common approach to estimating economy-wide rebound
effects is to use CGE models of regional or national economies. CGE
models are widely used for energy-economic analysis and are based
upon social accounting matrices for the relevant economies. They
consist of a set of simultaneous equations describing the behaviour of
producers, consumers and other economic actors, together with the in
terdependencies and feedback between different sectors. Multi-regional
or global CGE models do this for a number of regions and simulate the
trading links between those regions. CGE models are parameterised to
reflect the structural and behavioural characteristics of the relevant
economies and may be used to estimate the impact of ‘disturbances’ such
as improvements in the productivity of energy inputs (τ) within one or
more sectors – which is the most common way of representing improved
energy efficiency in such models. Here, the counterfactual is simply a
model run without any energy efficiency improvement [60].
CGE models have only recently been used to investigate rebound
effects, but the literature has grown substantially since the publication
of an earlier review in 2007 [70]. CGE models have a number of
well-established limitations (Appendix C), but these must be set against
the insights they provide into the complex adjustments that follow
specific disturbances – including the changes in input and commodity
prices, industrial structure, consumption patterns and trade patterns.
CGE models allow both the short-run and long-run magnitude of
rebound effects to be estimated and the relative contribution of different
mechanisms to be identified. The latter is much harder to achieve
through econometric analysis, owing to the need to control for multiple
conflicting variables [59].
Table 2 summarises the estimates of long-run, economy-wide
rebound effects from 21 CGE studies, while the Supplementary Infor
mation provides more detailed information on each study. Seven of the
studies model energy efficiency improvements by households, while the
remainder model improvements by producers. Three of the studies
[71–73] use multi-regional models to estimate global rebound effects,
while the remainder use regional (national or subnational) models to
estimate regional rebound effects. The modelled regions vary widely in
size, economic structure, openness to trade, aggregate energy intensity
and other relevant variables - all of which influence the size of the
estimated effects. All the CGE studies estimate rebound effects for en
ergy consumption (either in the aggregate, or for different fuels), with
the associated rebound effects for carbon (or GHG) emissions being
either larger or smaller depending upon the carbon (or GHG) intensity of
energy use in different sectors. For example, Bye, et al. [74] estimate that
energy efficiency improvements in Swedish households reduce
economy-wide energy use (with a rebound of ~40%) but increase
economy-wide carbon emissions (with a rebound of >100%), owing to
the low carbon intensity of Swedish electricity generation.
All of the studies simulate producer (consumer) behaviour through
‘nested’ constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production (utility)
functions (see Appendix C), although the level of aggregation, the
nesting structure, and the assumed parameter values vary widely from
one model to another. Most CGE models represent energy efficiency
improvements as a costless, one-off increase in the productivity of en
ergy inputs to producers (τ) or in the utility obtained from energy
commodities by consumers. Notable exceptions are Wei et al. [73] and
Duarte et al. [89], who model annual improvements in these variables.
The productivity improvements may affect all energy commodities or a
subset of those commodities (e.g., only electricity); and may apply to all
producers/households or to individual sectors/household groups. Bye
et al. [74] is the only study to allow for the capital costs of energy effi
ciency improvements, although Broberg et al. [80] include these in their
sensitivity tests. All of the studies model ‘pure’ energy efficiency im
provements that leave the productivity of other inputs (or the utility
obtained from other commodities) unchanged. In practice, energy
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Table 2
Estimates of long-run, economy-wide rebound effects from 21 CGE modelling studies.
Source

Region

Model
Type

Modelled energy efficiency improvement(s)

Baseline estimate of long-run, economywide rebound effect

Range of estimates
in sensitivity tests

Vikström [75]
Grepperud
et al. [76];

Sweden
Norway

Dynamic
Dynamic

UK

Dynamic

60%
Not quantified but modest in fisheries and
road transport, larger in paper and
chemicals, and >100% in metals
Elec = 27%;
Non-elec = 31%

60%

Allan et al.
[77]

15% (12%) in non-energy (energy) sectors.
Doubling growth rate of electricity productivity in paper,
metals, chemicals & finance (in turn), and growth rate of oil
productivity in fisheries and road transport (in turn)
5% in all production sectors

Hanley et al.
[78]

Scotland

Dynamic

5% in all production sectors

Elec = 131%;
Non-elec = 134%

Anson et al.
[79]
Guerra et al.
[60]
Broberg et al.
[80]

UK

Dynamic

5% in commercial transport sector

39%

Elec = 12%–58%;
Non-elec = 13%–
67%
Elec = 41%–250%
Non-Elec = 35%–
244%
37%–105%

Spain

Static

5% in all production sectors

87%

15%–230%

Sweden

Dynamic

1) All sectors = 73%
2) Non-energy = 69%
3) Energy-intensive = 78%

41%–81%

Yu et al. [81]

Georgia
(US)

Static

5% in:
1) all production sectors;
2) non-energy sectors;
3) energy-intensive sectors
10% in:
a) all production sectors;
b) individual production sectors

Elec = 10%–13%
Non-Elec =
22–27%

Garau et al.
[82]
Lu et al. [83]

Italy

Static

1% in all production sectors

All sectors:
Elec = 12%
Non-Elec = 25%
By sector: 309%–728%
21%

China

Static

5% for each energy type in turn in all production sectors

Wei et al. [73]
Koesler et al.
[72]

Global
Global

Dynamic
Static

Böhringer et al.
[71]

Global

Static

10% in non-energy production sectors
10% in German:
a) manufacturing sectors;
b) production sectors
1% in manufacturing, agriculture and services sectors in China,
the EU and the US (investigated in turn)

Du et al. [84]

China

Static

1%, 3% and 5% in construction sector

Koesler [85]
Lecca et al.
[86]
Figus et al.
[87]
Kulmer et al.
[88]
Duarte et al.
[89]
Bye et al. [74]

Germany
UK

Static
Dynamic

Scotland

Barkhordar
[90]

Coal = 21%; ‘
Oil-Gas’ = 42%;
Petroleum = 30%;
Electricity = 0.1%;
76%
a) 48%
b) 47%

5%–210%

21%–76%

60%–110%

10% in household transport energy use
5% in household energy use

Manufacturing = 65%–75%
Agriculture = 70%–90%
Services = 70–75%
Gas 99%; Coal 91%
Oil 89%; Elec 84%
49%
64%

Dynamic

5% in household energy use

50%

50%–78%

Austria

Static

10% in household fossil fuel use

65%

59%–73%

Spain

Dynamic

75%

51%–75%

Sweden

Dynamic

40%

17%–62%

Iran

Dynamic

20% reduction in household electricity and vehicle fuel use by
2030, relative to 2005
27% reduction in household energy use by 2030, relative to
baseline scenario
Adoption of energy efficient lighting by households

44%

35%–52%

efficiency improvements may derive from technologies that also
improve the productivity of other inputs – which in turn could lead to
larger rebound effects owing to the greater boost to economic output.
We make several observations from this review. First, the estimated
size of economy-wide rebound effects in the studies is highly sensitive to
various features of the relevant economy, as reflected in the assumed or
calibrated values of parameters such as, the elasticity of supply of capital
and labour, the elasticity of output demand in different sectors, the
energy intensity of those sectors, the potential for substitution between
different energy types, the potential for substitution between energy and
other inputs, the potential for substitution between energy and other
consumption goods, the expenditure elasticity of those goods, the elas
ticities of import and export demand, and the manner in which increased
tax revenue is used. For example, the contrasting economy-wide esti
mates from Hanley et al. [91] for Scotland (>100%) and Allan et al. [77]
for the UK (~30%) are largely explained by differences in the elasticity
of electricity exports in the modelled regions. Scotland is a major elec
tricity exporter to England and Wales, but the UK is only a minor elec
tricity exporter to the EU. Similarly, Allan et al. [77] estimate an

− 5%–49%

economy-wide rebound effect of 21% for electricity when assuming an
inelastic labour supply, but 47% when assuming an elastic labour
supply.
Second, the estimates of economy-wide rebound effects are partic
ularly sensitive to the assumed elasticities of substitution between en
ergy and other inputs, which indicate how easy it is for producers to
adjust to a change in relative prices – with easier substitution being
associated with larger rebound. There is a large empirical literature on
this topic [92], but the results are contradictory and difficult to inter
pret, and there is only a tenuous link between empirical estimates of
substitution elasticities and the assumptions used within CGE models
[55]. As a result, there is considerable uncertainty about the appropriate
values for these parameters and hence of the magnitude of the associated
rebound effects.
Third, the long-run rebound effect may either be larger or smaller
than the short-run effect. Although long-term adjustments generally
increase rebound effects, there are also countervailing forces. For
example, lower energy demand leads to lower energy prices, and if
energy demand is inelastic, this will reduce profitability and the return
8
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on capital in energy supply sectors. Lower profitability, in turn, may
cause energy sector firms to reduce capital investment (‘disinvestment’),
leading to a long-term reduction in the capital stock, which will drive up
energy prices and dampen the economy-wide rebound effect [93]. Shale
oil provides an example of such investment and disinvestment cycles
within the energy sector, triggered in part by fluctuations in global oil
prices.
Fourth, the global rebound effect may be smaller or larger than the
regional rebound effect (i.e. global energy savings may be larger or
smaller than regional energy savings), depending upon the model con
struction and assumptions. For example, Koesler, et al. [72] found that
energy efficiency improvements in German industry improve the
competitiveness of German producers, encourage increased exports and
thereby reduce production and energy use in other regions. At the same
time, energy efficiency improvements increase German GDP and wages,
increase domestic demand and imports, and thereby increase production
and energy use in other regions. The net result is that (in this case) the
global rebound effect is smaller than the rebound effect within Germany
alone.
Fifth, the rebound effects following energy efficiency improvements
by households may be comparable in size to those following energy
efficiency improvements by producers. While the latter increase pro
ductivity, stimulate economic growth, and improve national competi
tiveness; the former increase demand, put upward pressure on input and
product prices, and potentially reduce national competitiveness. But
despite these contrasting impacts, the modelling estimates suggest
rebound effects of comparable size. For producers, the studies suggest
that rebound effects tend to be larger following efficiency improvements
in energy-intensive sectors (including the energy sectors themselves)
and in sectors with a high output elasticity with respect to energy and/or
greater scope for substitution between energy and other inputs.
Finally, and most importantly, the CGE studies consistently estimate
large economy-wide rebound effects. Specifically, 13 of the 21 studies
provide baseline estimates of ~50% or more, and several estimate
almost 100% rebound. As a crude indicator, the mean (median), base
line estimate of economy-wide rebound effects from the 21 studies is
58% (55%) – with a mean of 65% (60%) from the 14 producer studies
and 55% (50%) from the 7 consumer studies. The associated sensitivity
tests suggest a remarkably wide range of possible outcomes, with the
lowest estimate of ~12% and the highest estimates exceeding 200%.
This wide range of estimates, together with the limitations of the
modelling approach (see Appendix C), limit the confidence we can have
in these results. Nevertheless, the evidence from CGE studies broadly
suggests that economy-wide rebound effects may erode more than
half of the energy savings from improved energy efficiency.

below.
5.1. Macroeconomic models
The macroeconomic models in Table 3 differ in important ways from
the CGE models discussed in Section 4 but incorporate parameters
estimated from empirical data. Rebound effects are typically estimated
by comparing model runs with and without energy efficiency
improvements.
Saunders [26] employs a Solow-Swan growth model with a CES
production function that includes a (KL)E nesting structure and
energy-augmenting technical change. Parameter values are taken from
Stern and Kander [103], who investigate the contribution of energy to
Swedish economic growth since 1850. By running scenarios with
different assumptions for technical change, Saunders estimates an
economy-wide rebound effect of 50–60% holding energy prices fixed.
These results are sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between en
ergy and other inputs (easier substitution leads to larger rebound), but
the magnitude of this elasticity is uncertain [55,92].
Barker et al. [94] employ a disaggregated, macro-econometric model
of the global economy (41 production sectors, 20 regions, 12 energy
carriers). They estimate the investment cost and energy savings from the
energy efficiency policies included in the 2006 IEA World Energy
Outlook (making explicit allowance for direct rebound effects) and
incorporate these exogenously into the model. They then estimate the
indirect and macroeconomic rebound effects by comparing scenarios
with and without these policies, leading to an estimated economy-wide
rebound effect of ~50% by 2030, most of which derives from increased
output.
Lemoine [95] develops a general equilibrium model and derives
analytical expressions for partial and general equilibrium rebound ef
fects following energy efficiency improvements by producers. The ex
pressions isolate the contribution of individual mechanisms to rebound
effects, such as changes in labour supply and the expansion and
contraction of the energy sector. The model is not calibrated to a
particular economy, but Lemoine estimates a rebound effect of 38% by
setting input cost shares and substitution elasticities in line with US data,
with a 28% rebound for improvements in non-energy sectors, and 80%
for improvements in the energy sector. The results are sensitive to the
assumed elasticity of substitution between different consumption goods,
as well as between different production inputs.
Rausch and Schwerin [96] develop a two-sector (production and
consumption good-producing) general equilibrium model, where both
business equipment and consumption goods are produced by a combi
nation of non-energy capital, labour and energy services – and where the
latter is produced by a combination of energy-using capital and energy.
They model investment in different vintages of energy-using capital,
where the efficiency of each vintage depends upon energy-augmenting
technical change and energy prices. Both lower-priced capital and
higher-priced energy lead to more energy efficient capital, but these
mechanisms have different macroeconomic effects. Rausch and
Schwerin calibrate the model to US data over the period 1960–2011 and
estimate rebound effects by comparing the historical trend with a sce
nario in which energy service prices are fixed. They estimate a rebound
of 102%, suggesting all expected energy savings were taken back by
different rebound mechanisms.

5. Estimates of economy-wide rebound effects from other
methods
Researchers have explored a variety of other (non-CGE) methods for
estimating economy-wide rebound effects which vary in their specifi
cation of energy efficiency improvements (Section 3) and their inclusion
of different rebound mechanisms (Appendix B). Table 3 classifies 12
selected studies within this category into three broad groups – macro
economic models, econometric analysis, and growth accounting – and
summarises the key features of each study, together with their estimates
of economy-wide rebound effects. We briefly review these studies
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Table 3
Estimates of economy-wide rebound effects from a selection of non-CGE studies.
Category

Source

Region, Period

Model structure

Specification of energy
efficiency

Method of estimating economy-wide
rebound effect

Baseline
estimate of
economy-wide
rebound effect

Macroeconomic
models

Saunders
[26]

Sweden,
1850–2000

Solow growth model with a (KL,
E), CES aggregate production
function incorporating energyaugmenting technical change

Energy-augmenting
technical change (τ)

Ratio of modelled actual energy
savings to modelled potential energy
savings

50–60%

Barker et al.
[94]

Global
2010–2030

41-sector, 20-region macroeconometric model of the global
economy (E3MG)

Energy efficiency
policies included in the
2006 IEA World Energy
Outlook

Direct rebound effect assumed.
Indirect and macroeconomic effects
estimated from ratio of modelled
actual energy savings to modelled
potential energy savings

52%

Lemoine
[95]

Non-specific,
but cost share
and elasticity
data from US

General equilibrium model with
N production sectors and an
energy sector

Energy-augmenting
technical change (τ)

Analytical expressions decomposing
the rebound into a number of partial
and general equilibrium effects

38%
80% energy
sector
28% other
sectors

Rausch and
Schwerin
[96]

US
1960–2011

Two sector (production and
consumption) general
equilibrium model with different
vintages of energy-using capital

Energy-augmenting
technical change (τ)

Ratio of modelled actual energy
savings to modelled potential energy
savings

102%

Adetutu
et al. [97]

55 countries
1980–2010

Stochastic frontier analysis to
estimate energy efficiency.
Autoregressive, dynamic panel
model to estimate efficiency
elasticity of energy demand

Distance to frontier in a
panel of 55 countries

Efficiency elasticity of energy
demand

90% (short
term)
− 36% (long
term)

Brockway
et al. [98]

China, US, UK
1980–2010

(KL,U) CES aggregate production
function (U = useful exergy),
with neutral technical change

Aggregate primary to
useful exergy efficiency
of national economy (U/
X)

Elasticity of primary exergy with
respect to primary to useful exergy
efficiency

US 13%
(12–16%)
UK 13% (13∞%)
China 208%
(55-∞%)

Wei [99]

40 regions
1995–2009

Cobb Douglas aggregate
production function with inputaugmenting technical change

Aggregate primary
energy efficiency of
national economy (Y/E)

Decomposed change in output
caused by change in energy intensity

Mean 150%
Median 120%
(− 2716% to
+636%)

Bruns et al.
[62]

US
1973–2016

Structural vector auto-regression
for aggregate GDP, energy use
and energy prices - used to
identify energy efficiency shocks

Energy-augmenting
technical change

Estimated impulse response function
for energy use following energy
efficiency shock

~100%

Lin & Liu
[100]

China,
1981–2009

Historical data for energy
intensity and output changes.
Malmquist index to estimate
total factor productivity

Aggregate energy
efficiency index derived
from log mean divisia
analysis of sectoral final
energy efficiencies

53%

Shao et al.
[101]

China
1954–2010

Historical data for energy
intensity and output changes.
Latent variable analysis to
estimate total factor productivity

Aggregate primary
energy efficiency (Y/E)

Lin and Du
[102]

China
1981–2011

Historical data for energy
intensity and output changes.
Translog aggregate production
function to estimate total factor
productivity

Aggregate energy
efficiency index, derived
from log mean divisia
analysis of sectoral final
energy efficiencies

Ratio of the change in energy
consumption from the output growth
attributed to technical change, to the
change in energy consumption
attributed to changes in aggregate
energy efficiency
Ratio of the change in energy
consumption from the output growth
attributed to technical change, to the
change in energy consumption
attributed to changes in aggregate
energy efficiency
Ratio of the change in energy
consumption from the output growth
attributed to technical change, to the
change in energy consumption
attributed to changes in aggregate
energy efficiency

Brockway
et al. [98]

China, US, UK
1980–2010

Historical data for energy
intensity and output changes.
(KL,U) CES aggregate production
function (U = useful exergy) to
estimate total factor productivity

Aggregate primary
energy efficiency (Y/E)

Ratio of the change in energy
consumption from the output growth
attributed to technical change, to the
change in energy consumption
attributed to changes in aggregate
energy efficiency

US 40%
(15–47%)
UK 54%
(50–57%)
China 77%
(64–83%)

Econometric
analysis

Growth
accounting

10

40%
(47% before
2000
37% after
2000)
30–40%
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5.2. Econometric analysis

aggregate energy intensity (It ). Both Shao et al. [101] and Brockway
[98] use aggregate primary energy intensity (Y/ EP ), while both Lin and
Liu [100] and Lin and Du [102] use an energy efficiency index – which
separates the effect of final energy intensity reductions within individual
sectors from structural change between those sectors [109]. Studies also
vary in how they define and estimate total factor productivity (At ). For
example, Brockway et al. [98] estimate an aggregate CES production
function, Lin and Liu [100] estimate a Malmquist index [110], Lin and
Du [102] estimate an aggregate translog production function and Shao
et al. [101] use latent variable analysis. These four studies estimate
economy-wide rebound effects in the range 30–77%.

These studies estimate rebound effects directly from the econometric
analysis of secondary data.
Adetutu et al. [97] combine a stochastic frontier analysis with a
two-stage dynamic panel data approach for 55 countries over the period
1980–2010. Taking the whole sample together, Adetutu et al. [97] es
timate a 90% rebound in the short run, but a negative rebound (− 36%) in
the long run.
Brockway et al. [98] estimate aggregate, three-input CES production
functions for the US, UK and China over the period 1980–2010,
including neutral technical change. They follow Saunders [26] in using a
(KL)E nesting structure, but replace primary energy (E) with ‘useful
exergy’ (U) which is the product of primary exergy inputs (X) and the
estimated primary-to-useful exergy efficiency (ε) of the economy (i.e.
U = εX). Their measure of useful exergy therefore partly incorporates
the effect of energy-augmenting technical change [104,105]. Using an
iterative, non-linear estimation procedure combined with a ‘boot
strapping’ technique, they find large error bounds on their estimated
parameters. Following Saunders [106], they estimate the economy-wide
rebound effect from the elasticity of primary exergy consumption with
respect to primary-to-useful exergy efficiency [105]. Their estimated
rebound effect is 13% for the US and UK and >100% for China – sug
gesting that rebound effects may be higher in energy-intensive, expor
t-oriented economies.
Wei and Liu [107] estimate Cobb-Douglas aggregate production
functions with input-augmenting technical change for 40 countries be
tween 1995 and 2009. By deriving and parameterising an expression for
the change in output following a change in aggregate energy intensity,
Wei et al. [99] estimate a mean rebound effect of 150% for the sample as
a whole, with estimates for individual countries ranging (rather
implausibly) from − 2716% (Brazil) to +636% (Indonesia).
Lastly, Bruns et al. [62] estimate US energy consumption, GDP, and
energy prices as a function of the lags of these variables and a vector of
contemporaneous exogenous shocks. They identify the latter through
Independent Component Analysis, which applies machine learning
techniques to identify independent linear combinations of the residuals.
They interpret the energy efficiency shocks as energy-augmenting
technical change, since they are independent of changes in GDP and
energy prices. They estimate rebound effects by constructing the im
pulse response function of energy with respect to the identified energy
efficiency shocks. Using monthly and quarterly data from the US over
the period 1973–2016, Bruns et al. [62] estimate a rebound effect of
100% after four years.

5.4. Summary
Each of the studies in Table 3 provides useful insights, but each also
has important limitations. For example, Saunders [26], Wei et al. [99],
Brockway et al. [98] Lin and Du [102] employ aggregate production
functions which some economists consider invalid [111,112]. Lemoine
[95] and Rausch and Schwerin [96] develop simplified general equi
librium models that have similar drawbacks to CGE models, but with an
even weaker foundation in empirically measured parameters. The study
by Adetutu et al. [97] is difficult to interpret and finds a negative
long-run rebound effect which contradicts the findings of all other
studies in this area. The growth accounting studies almost certainly
underestimate rebound effects, owing to their choice of aggregate en
ergy efficiency as the independent variable (which neglects rebound
effects from efficiency improvements at lower levels of aggregation) and
their assumption that increases in output are the primary driver of
rebound (which neglects other rebound mechanisms). Overall, partic
ular weight can be placed upon the study by Barker et al. [94], since their
macro-econometric model overcomes many of the limitations of CGE
models and their measure of energy efficiency improvements is most
relevant to public policy by virtue of implementing the anticipated en
ergy reductions of energy efficiency policies. The study by Bruns et al.
[62] is also significant, since it opens up a promising new approach to
estimating rebound effects that relies upon few a-priori assumptions.
Barker et al. [94] estimate an economy-wide rebound of 50%, while
Bruns et al. [62] estimate a rebound of ~100%.
However, the most notable finding from this review of other methods
is that the studies consistently estimate large economy-wide rebound
effects. Specifically, 10 of the 12 studies in Table 3 provide baseline
estimates of ~50% or more, and three estimate >100% rebound. As a
crude indicator, the mean estimate of economy-wide rebound effects
from the 12 studies is 71% – with a mean of 62% from the macroeco
nomic models, 104% from the econometric studies, and 46% from the
growth accounting studies. This consistency is all the more surprising
given the widely different measures of energy efficiency (e.g., aggregate
energy intensity, primary to useful exergy efficiency, energy-augmented
technical change), the range of methodologies employed (e.g., growth
accounting, stochastic frontier analysis), the variations in model struc
ture (e.g., aggregate production functions, general equilibrium models,
macro-econometric models), and the differences in the number and type
of rebound mechanisms included (e.g., growth effect only versus most of
the mechanisms in Appendix B). These differences demonstrate that
there is much to learn about the determinants and magnitude of
economy-wide rebound effects and much work to do in reconciling the
definitions, approaches and conclusions of different studies. Neverthe
less, the results broadly reinforce the conclusion from the review of CGE
studies, namely that economy-wide rebound effects may erode more
than half of the energy savings from improved energy efficiency.
Having reviewed the evidence on the size of economy-wide rebound

5.3. Growth accounting
These studies employ growth accounting techniques, which specify
the rate of growth of output as the weighted sum of the rate of growth of
each input, plus the rate of total factor productivity growth (At ) – which
is commonly estimated as a residual [108]. Letting Yt represent aggre
gate economic output in period t, Et primary energy consumption and It
aggregate energy intensity (Et /Yt ), the studies estimate economy-wide
rebound effects from variants of Eqn. (1) [98]:
Rt =

At+1 (Yt+1 − Yt )It+1
Yt+1 (It − It+1 )

1

Here the denominator is interpreted as the potential energy savings
and the numerator is interpreted as the change in energy consumption
resulting from the output increase attributed to technical change.
Studies using this approach vary in how they define and estimate
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effects, we now examine the treatment of these effects in energyeconomy models.

production functions incorporating energy-augmenting technical
change, and both are able to capture substitution between energy and
other inputs and energy price and growth effects – three of the mecha
nisms contributing to rebound effects (Appendix B). However, since they
assume a single representative producer, they cannot capture composi
tion effects or variations in rebound effects between sectors. Similarly,
since they assume a single representative final good, they cannot capture
substitution effects for consumers. Both IAMs model multiple types of
final energy demand (an input into the aggregate production function),
so have the potential to model income (consumer) and output (pro
ducer) effects for other energy input services, together with energy
market effects.
Fourth, the general equilibrium IAMs treat energy-augmenting
technical change in a different manner to the CGE studies reviewed in
Section 4. The latter simulate improved energy efficiency as a costless,
one-off increase in the productivity of energy inputs (τ) and investigate
the impacts on aggregate energy intensity (θE ) and other macroeco
nomic variables. They then estimate rebound effects by comparing the
results with those from a scenario with no technical change. In contrast,
the IAMs begin with exogenous baseline scenarios for energy demand or
energy intensity (θE ) and use these to calibrate the energy-augmenting
technical change parameters. The latter remain fixed in the policy sce
narios, which instead model price-induced substitution of capital for
energy in response to changes in energy and carbon prices – supple
mented in some cases with bottom-up modelling of fuel switching and
technology improvements in individual sectors [120], and in others with
top-down modeling of price-, learning-, or R&D-induced technological
changes [121]. Hence, from the perspective of capturing rebound ef
fects, the IAMs work backwards - they calibrate energy-augmenting
technical change to an assumed outcome, rather than modelling the
outcomes from energy-augmenting technical change.9
In sum, partial equilibrium IAMs exclude the majority of mechanisms
contributing to rebound effects, while general equilibrium IAMs incor
porate more of these mechanisms but in a highly simplified manner.
Moreover, the process of calibrating baseline scenarios to exogenous
assumptions for energy demand and energy intensity precludes the
investigation of rebound effects from energy-augmenting technical
change within a model run. Instead, the energy efficiency improvements
within IAM policy scenarios reflect a mix of substitution, endogenous
technological change and bottom-up modelling of technology choices
within individual sectors. Given that assumptions about energy intensity
and economic growth appear the most important determinants of future
emissions [122], this relatively crude modelling of the determinants of
energy intensity appears an important limitation of current IAMs and
creates a risk that IAM scenarios will overestimate the potential for
energy intensity reductions and/or underestimate the impact of
rebound effects on energy demand.

6. Rebound effects in energy-economy models
The scenarios summarised in Section 2 derive from a variety of
models with widely differing structures, methodologies, levels of
complexity, and assumptions for key variables. Here we investigate the
extent to which these models capture the various mechanisms contrib
uting to rebound effects and hence whether they may potentially un
derestimate the size of those effects. We first review the integrated
assessment models (IAMs) used by the IPCC and then the global energy
models used by other organisations. We base the review upon model
documentation and email responses from modelling teams. However,
some of our judgments are uncertain since there is only limited infor
mation in the public domain for many of the IAMs, and even less for
most of the global energy models.
6.1. Integrated assessment models (IAMs)
IAMs capture the interactions and feedbacks between the economy,
energy system, and climate system. They typically combine simplified
economic and climate models with more detailed modelling of regional
and global energy systems, but they vary widely in the level of detail
within each component. Most IAMs model energy supply in great detail,
but treat the determinants of energy demand in a simpler manner [113].
Similarly, for some IAMs key economic variables are exogenous. Both of
these features limit their ability to endogenously model rebound effects.
Table 4 summarises some key features of the four IAMs used for the
scenarios reviewed in Section 2, including their representation of the
macro-economy, their specification of energy efficiency, and our
assessment of their ability to capture rebound effects. Each of these IAMs
is a ‘marker model’ for one of the Shared Socio-economic Pathways
(SSPs) used in the IPCC’s sixth assessment report – which means that
each model provides a preferred implementation of the relevant SSP
[34,114].
We make four observations from this review. First, the IAM docu
mentation contains practically no reference to rebound effects and no
study to date has used these IAMs to explore or quantify rebound effects
– suggesting that the IAM community has largely overlooked this topic.
Although IAM modelling teams regularly carry out model comparisons
to establish patterns of model behaviour and to explain differences in
results [119], the relevance of rebound effects to these results remains
unexplored. One exception is the “Low Energy Demand” Scenario [32] –
see also Table 1 - that discusses a 50% rebound effect. However, this is
an exogenous adjustment of energy demand, rather than one generated
within the model.
Second, IMAGE and GCAM are partial equilibrium models and
therefore use exogenous assumptions for economic growth and the
development of the macro-economy. By construction, such models can
only include a limited number of rebound mechanisms: specifically in
GCAM a direct rebound effect from a negative price elasticity for energy
service demand, potentially combined with an energy market rebound
effect from a negative price elasticity for aggregate energy demand.
Whilst more rebound channels were identified in IMAGE, the extent to
which both IMAGE and GCAM actually capture their mechanisms,
together with the relative magnitude of each effect, is difficult to discern
from the model documentation.
Third, MESSAGE-GLOBIOM and REMIND are general equilibrium in
the sense that they include endogenous modelling of the macroeconomy, although with a single-sector growth model, not a multisectoral one, like CGE models.8 Both models employ aggregate CES

6.2. Global energy models
In contrast to IAMs, the global energy models from bp, Shell, the EIA,
and the IEA focus solely upon projecting the evolution of the global
energy system and the balance between energy supply and demand.
These are all bottom-up simulation models, but they differ in structure,
level of disaggregation (by regions, sectors, fuels and technologies), and
key assumptions. A common feature is their reliance upon exogenous
assumptions for GDP, population, and other key variables.
The most detailed and best documented model is the IEA World
9
Different baseline-policy scenario combinations assume different energy
intensity improvements so in principle pairs of these could be compared to each
other for rebounds. The authors are grateful to Joeri Rogelj for this observation.

8
The AIM/CGE model, another SSP marker model, is an exception and does
provide a CGE structure.
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Table 4
Modelling of rebound effects in four Integrated Assessment Models.
Integrated
Assessment
Model

Type

Regions

Modelling of the macro-economy

Modelling of energy demand and
improved energy efficiency

Modelling of rebound effects

IMAGE

Partial
equilibrium
Recursive
dynamic

26

Limited economic modelling.
Exogenous assumptions for population,
per-capita GDP and other variables

IMAGE model energy demand for a range
of end-use functions in six sectors,
including industry [115], transport
[116], and residential [117]. The end-use
functions (such as lighting, heating,
cooling, hot water and appliances in the
residential sector) are represented on the
basis of relationships with economic
activity levels that physical activity
indicators (such as tonnes of steel,
passenger kilometers per transport
mode), structural change and both
autonomous energy efficiency
improvements (AEEI) and price induced
energy efficiency improvements (PIEEI).
Subsequently, different energy carriers
and associated technologies compete for
market share on the basis of costs and
preferences. The latter also include
options for electrification.
AEEI for new capital increases as a
fraction (0.3–0.45) of the economic
growth rate. PIEEI estimated from cost
curves for energy conservation (specified
for each sector and energy carrier) using
current energy prices.
Some sectors modelled in greater detail,
including competing technologies with
different energy efficiencies.

Direct: several. Decreasing costs of energy
supply in response to efficiency measures
can lead to increases in activity levels
(such as transport activity) or reduction of
investments in efficiency.
Indirect: Several. Decreasing costs of
energy supply in response to efficiency
measures in one sector, can significantly
impact measures in other sectors. Similar
holds for measures to reduce costs of
energy supply.
Macroeconomic: Energy market effect
(lower price of energy induces greater
demand).

MESSAGEGLOBIOM

General
equilibrium
Intertemporal
optimisation

11

MACRO model maximises
intertemporal utility function of a
single representative consumer in each
region.
Production allocated to current
consumption, non-energy capital
investment and energy system costs –
with the latter estimated by an energy
model (MESSAGE).
Employs nested (KL)E CES aggregate
production function.

Modelling begins with assumptions about
energy intensity and GDP. Macro model
(MACRO) then runs iteratively with the
energy supply model (MESSAGE),
adjusting GDP, energy demand and
energy prices until a consistent solution is
found [118].
Improved energy efficiency is modelled
in three ways:
• Substitution of capital for energy in the
aggregate production function,
assuming an elasticity of substitution
of between 0.2 and 0.3.
• Energy augmenting technical change.
The calibration process adjusts these
parameters to ensure consistency with
exogenous assumptions for regional
energy intensity.
• Fuel switching in response to relative
prices, which can also lead to
efficiency improvements - for example
through electrification.

Direct: positive elasticity of substitution
in CES production function.
Indirect: none, since single sector model,
though income effects possible between
different energy types
Macroeconomic: Energy market and
growth effects

GCAM

Partial
equilibrium
Recursive
dynamic

32

Limited economic modelling.
Exogenous assumptions for population,
per-capita GDP and other variables

Detailed bottom up modelling of energy
demand in key sectors (e.g. transport),
including assumptions about technical
efficiency and price elasticity

Direct: negative price elasticities of
energy service demand.
Indirect: none
Macroeconomic: energy market effect.

REMINDMAgPIE

General
equilibrium
Intertemporal
optimisation

11

Maximises intertemporal utility
function of a single representative
consumer in each region, accounting
for inter-regional trade in goods,
energy and carbon allowances.
Production allocated to consumption,
exports, investment, R&D, and energy
costs (investment, fuel & O&M) – with
the latter estimated by an energy
system module.
Output simulated by non-nested (KLE)
CES production function, with final
energy (E) produced by nested CES
production function - both
incorporating input-augmenting
technical change.

Energy-augmenting parameter (τ)
assumed to change at the same rate as
labour augmenting parameter (ρ),
modified by an adjustment factor that is
specific to each region and energy
carrier. Calibration process adjusts the
former to ensure consistency with
exogenous scenarios for energy demand.
Latter, in turn, are based upon historical
relationships between per-capita GDP
and energy demand, combined with
assumptions about long-term
convergence [119].
Improved energy efficiency is modelled
in three ways:

Direct: positive elasticity of substitution
in CES production function.
Indirect none since single sector model,
though income effects possible among
different energy types
Macroeconomic: energy market and
growth effects.

(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued )
Integrated
Assessment
Model

Type

Regions

Modelling of the macro-economy

Modelling of energy demand and
improved energy efficiency

GDP is endogenous, but calibrated to
an exogenous baseline scenario by
adjusting parameters for labouraugmenting technical change.

• Substitution of capital for energy in the
aggregate production function,
assuming an elasticity of substitution
of between 0.25 and 0.5.
• Energy augmenting technical change.
The calibration process adjusts these
parameters to ensure consistency with
exogenous assumptions for regional
energy intensity.
• Fuel switching in response to relative
prices. This can also lead to efficiency
improvements - for example through
electrification.

Modelling of rebound effects

Source: Model documentation [19,42–44] and contacts with the modelling teams.

Energy Model (WEM), which is used to produce the annual IEA World
Energy Outlook reports (WEOs).10 The WEM distinguishes between six
industrial sectors, six types of energy service in buildings (e.g., water
heating, cooking, space cooling), five transport sub-models (e.g. road,
air, rail), and multiple energy carriers (e.g., gasoline, diesel, liquefied
natural gas) [45]. A simulation begins with exogenous assumptions for
the growth in energy service demand, derived by combining econo
metric analysis of historical trends with assumptions for key scenario
drivers. The model then calculates the mix of technologies used to meet
these demands, based upon the age and structure of the existing capital
stock, energy and carbon prices, and the assumed cost and performance
of new technologies [45]. Iterations between the energy supply and
energy demand modules leads to energy prices that match available
supply with projected demand for each energy carrier. This approach
allows for the detailed exploration of individual technology choices, but
provides only limited feedback between the price of energy services and
the macro-economy – which restricts the ability of the model to capture
macroeconomic rebounds.
The WEM does capture energy market effects, however, since lower
energy demand leads to lower energy prices, which in turn encourages
increased energy demand. To counteract this rebound, the IEA increase
transport fuel duty in their 2019 Sustainable Development Scenario “to
keep end-user prices at the same level as in the Stated Policies Scenario”
[p.18, 45]. However, they make no mention of comparable adjustments
to the price of other fuels.
The approach of the other global energy models with regard to
rebound is broadly comparable to that of the WEM, but less detail is
provided in Table 5, as there is less information on the bp, Shell and EIA
models in the public domain.11 Direct rebound effects are modelled for
some (but not all) energy services through the use of price elasticities for
those services, but the relevant assumptions are not transparent. The
energy market effect is captured via price elasticities, but indirect re
bounds and other types of macroeconomic rebound are excluded since
they cannot be simulated within a bottom-up structure. The documen
tation for each model makes little or no reference to rebound effects and
contacts with the modelling teams suggest only limited consideration of
the topic. The 2012 edition of the IEA WEO [123] stated that an
economy-wide rebound effect of 10% was assumed, but subsequent
editions of the Outlook make no reference to this assumption. A 10%
rebound is relatively small, even considering direct effects alone, and is

Table 5
Inclusion of rebound effects in a selection of global energy models.
Global energy
model

Modelling of the macroeconomy

Modelling of rebound effects

Global modelling
for BP Energy
Outlook

Exogenous, via regional
projections of population,
per-capita GDP, energy
intensity and other
variables

Direct: included via
assumptions for the own-price
elasticity of some energy
services.
Indirect none
Macroeconomic: energy
market effect.

Shell World
Energy Model

Exogenous, via regional
projections of population
and per-capita GDP

Direct: included via
assumptions for the own-price
elasticity of energy services,
together with an ‘energy
ladder’ effect for energy
services in developing
countries.
Indirect: none.
Macroeconomic: energy
market effect

IEA World Energy
Model

Exogenous, via regional
projections of population,
per-capita GDP, energy
service demand and other
variables. GDP
assumptions based on
OECD, IMF and World
Bank projections,
combined with
assumptions about longterm convergence of
growth rates between
regions.

Direct: included via
assumptions for the own-price
elasticity of some energy
services
Indirect: none.
Macroeconomic: energy
market effect

EIA World Energy
Projection
System Plus
(WEPS+)

Exogenous, via regional
projections of population,
per-capita GDP, energy
service demand and other
variables. GDP
assumptions from the
Oxford Economics Global
Economic Model (GEM)
and Global Industry Model
(GIM)

Direct: included via
assumptions for the own-price
elasticity of some energy
services
Indirect: none.
Macroeconomic: energy
market effect

Source: Model documentation [45,46,49,47] and contacts with the modelling
teams.

10
The World Energy Outlook is published each year by the IEA, and examines
how the global energy system could develop in the future, usually to 2030/
2040/2050. For the WEO-2020 see https://www.iea.org/reports/world-ene
rgy-outlook-2020.
11
Available documentation [45-47,49,] was supplemented by contact with
modelling teams.
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inconsistent with the evidence reviewed in Section 4 and 5. For com
parison, Barker et al. [94] estimate a 50% rebound for the energy effi
ciency measures included in the 2006 WEO.
In sum, the structure of the global energy models largely preclude the
simulation of rebound effects, creating the risk that global energy
scenarios will overestimate the potential for energy intensity re
ductions and/or underestimate the impact of rebound effects on
energy demand.

systematic review of the IAM and global energy model structures and
their inclusion (or not) of different rebound mechanisms would be of
benefit to all modelling teams. Colmenares et al. [127] provide some
suggestions in this regard.
Finally, the representation of energy efficiency improvements within
empirical studies frequently differs from the simulation of such im
provements within the integrated assessment and global energy models.
More than 70% of the reviewed studies simulate energy efficiency im
provements as a costless, one-off increase in the productivity of energy
inputs (energy-augmenting technical change). In contrast, the inte
grated assessment and global energy models tend to start from historical
correlations between aggregate output and energy demand, and then
increase the rate at which energy intensity falls by possibly priceinduced energy-augmenting technical change, without accounting for
the majority of channels via which rebound operates. As a result, the
energy efficiency improvements simulated in these scenarios may
potentially lead to smaller rebound effects than the energy-augmenting
technical change investigated by the empirical studies. Although
depicted in current IAMs as a ‘deviation’ from an optimal baseline tra
jectory and hence growth-retarding by construction, price or policyinduced energy-augmenting technical change could also accelerate the
growth of the economy whilst reducing energy demand, but only if the
associated rebound effects are relatively modest. Our concern is that the
opposite may be the case, and that large, economy-wide rebound effects
could undermine the effectiveness of global climate policy focussed on
energy efficiency.

7. Discussion
We now summarise the lessons learned from the preceding sections.
First, the majority of global energy scenarios include a structural break
in energy demand trends, beginning around 2020 and moving towards
absolute decoupling of energy consumption from GDP as climate targets
tighten. Scenario projections of annual changes in aggregate final energy
intensity in the period 2020–2030 (− 2.5%/year) is twice the mean
annual change since 1971 (− 1.2%/year), and has been observed in only
4 of 47 years in the 1971–2018 period. As Stern observes “this does not
mean that such a rate of decline is impossible” [p.538, 124], but it does
raise legitimate queries over the mechanisms and policies that will
enable this to be achieved.
Second, the evidence on the size of economy-wide rebound effects
has grown rapidly over the last few years and has led to broadly
consistent conclusions. For example, 13 of the 21 CGE modelling studies
reviewed above estimated an economy-wide rebound effect of 50% or
more, as did 10 of the 12 studies that used other methodologies. Hence,
it seems reasonable to conclude that economy-wide rebound effects
erode more than half of the energy savings from improved energy
efficiency. This is a larger figure than is commonly found in studies of
direct rebound effects for consumers [27,125], and the focus on the
latter within the rebound literature may have diverted attention away
from the possibility of larger rebound effects at the economy-wide level.
In addition, there is growing evidence that rebound effects are larger for
energy efficiency improvements by producers, particularly in
energy-intensive sectors. Stern [126] also finds growing support for
large, economy-wide rebound.
Third, it is challenging to compare the results of the empirical studies
and to draw overall conclusions, owing to the different definitions of the
relevant independent variable (improved energy efficiency), together
with the varying coverage of rebound mechanisms, the differing meth
odologies employed, and the sensitivity of results to key assumptions.
Such variability in parameters is particularly evident in CGE models,
whose results are highly sensitive to assumed values for substitution
elasticities that lack a firm empirical grounding [55]. However, these
uncertainties have not prevented the widespread use of CGE models in
other areas of research, and these methodological differences and limi
tations have not prevented a growing consensus that economy-wide
rebound effects are larger than typically assumed.
Fourth, integrated assessment and global energy models only capture
a subset of the mechanisms contributing to economy-wide rebound ef
fects, partly because these models either include a relatively crude
representation of the macro-economy (e.g., a single representative
producer and consumer), or rely upon exogenous assumptions for key
macroeconomic variables, which in turn means there is only limited
feedback between energy efficiency improvements and broader changes
in economic structure and energy demand. In addition, rebound effects
have not been a priority for the modelling teams. The IAM community
has focused upon other areas of model development, while the global
energy model community has focused upon updating parameter as
sumptions and re-estimating scenarios for the next publication. A

8. Conclusions
Many climate and energy scenarios project a significant departure
from the historical close relationship between global energy consump
tion and GDP and a move towards absolute decoupling. These scenarios
assume rapid improvements in energy efficiency through all sectors of
the global economy and a shift towards less energy-intensive con
sumption patterns. However, the evidence reviewed in this paper sug
gests that economy-wide rebound effects could erode more than half of
the anticipated energy savings. Since the mechanisms contributing to
these effects are only poorly captured by the relevant models, global
energy scenarios may overestimate the potential for decoupling energy
consumption from GDP. Large rebound effects may therefore provide
one explanation for the historical close relationship between energy
consumption and GDP and at the same time may make it more difficult
to decouple energy consumption from GDP the future.
The review has highlighted multiple limitations in the available ev
idence, which limits the degree of confidence that we can have in the
results. However, the review also demonstrates that the evidence base is
growing in quality, quantity, and diversity, and that widely different
studies provide broadly similar conclusions. Importantly, the implica
tions of this evidence appears to have been largely neglected by the
integrated assessment and global energy modelling communities, and
the current generation of energy-economy models lacks the capacity to
capture these rebound effects effectively. The inclusion of broader,
economy-wide rebound effects within energy and IAM models are vital if
we are to have confidence in global energy scenarios, and if policy
makers are to effectively anticipate and address the possibility of large
rebounds.
We suggest that a research priorities should be to (a) include more
comprehensive and disaggregated modelling of the macro-economy
within energy-economy models and (b) to find ways to endogenously
incorporate a broader range of rebound mechanisms. Efforts are also
required to (a) reconcile the divergent representations of energy
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efficiency within both empirical studies in energy-economy models and
(b) to further explore the implications of different types, sources, and
locations of energy efficiency improvement. Moving towards more
robustly reported analytical frameworks within rebound studies would
allow better comparisons, and eventually meta reviews, such as is
common in the energy-GDP causality literature [128]. Meantime, if
large, economy-wide rebound is a possibility, it would be prudent to
explore scenarios with more limited decoupling of energy consumption
from GDP and to assess their implications – presumably implying greater
urgency in decarbonising energy supply. Modelling efforts should also
extend to estimating and including rebound effects, in conjunction with
sensitivity testing, and to assessing strategies to offset those effects while
minimising the impact on welfare.
In sum, radical departures from the historical energy-GDP trends
raise important questions about their feasibility. Much greater attention
should therefore be placed on understanding the determinants of energy
demand and on assessing the risk of unanticipated outcomes.
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Appendix A. Primary Energy plots

Fig. A1. Historical trends and future scenarios for global primary energy use and GDP (1971–2050). Notes: Scenario plots are in four groups: orange (IEA models);
green (1.5 ◦ C IAMs); purple (2.0 ◦ C IAMs) and blue (other models). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
Web version of this article.)
16

P.E. Brockway et al.

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 141 (2021) 110781

Fig. A2. Historical trends and future scenarios for annual change in primary energy intensity (1971–2050) Notes: Annual percentage change in global final energy
intensity (plotted annually for the historical trend, and as a decadal average for each scenario). Black dotted line is linear regression/projection of historical trends.
The scenario plots are in four groups: orange (IEA models); green (1.5 ◦ C IAMs); purple (2.0 ◦ C IAMs) and blue (other models). (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)

Appendix B. Mechanisms contributing to economy-wide rebound effects

Category

Mechanism

Source

Direct rebound effect (partial equilibrium)

Income effect (consumers)

Changes in the consumption of the energy service, owing to the increase
in real income stimulated by
the energy efficiency improvement

Substitution effect
(consumers)

Changes in the consumption of the energy service, owing to a fall in its
effective price relative to other commodities (holding utility constant)

Output effect (producers)

Changes in the consumption of the energy service owing to the increase
in output stimulated by the energy efficiency improvement
Changes in the consumption of the energy service, owing to a fall in its
effective price relative to other inputs (holding output constant)
Changes in the consumption of other commodities, owing to the increase in
real income stimulated by the energy efficiency improvement
Changes in the consumption of other commodities, owing to an increase in
their effective price relative to the energy service (holding utility constant)
Changes in the consumption of other inputs owing to the increase in
output stimulated by the energy efficiency improvement
Changes in the consumption of other inputs, owing to an increase in their
effective price relative to the energy service (holding output constant)
Changes in energy consumption following changes in energy prices
(leftward shift of the demand curve for energy)
Changes in energy consumption following structural change in the economy - with
energy-intensive sectors and goods benefiting more
Changes in energy consumption following investment and increased output
stimulated by the energy efficiency improvement
Changes in energy consumption following reductions in the price of goods and
services stimulated by increased output of those goods and services
Changes in energy consumption following increases in real wages stimulated by the energy
efficiency improvement
Changes in energy consumption following disinvestment in the energy supply
sectors in response to lower energy prices

Indirect rebound effect (partial equilibrium)

Substitution effect
(producers)
Income effect (consumers)
Substitution effect
(consumers)
Output effect (producers)

Macroeconomic rebound effect (general
equilibrium)

Substitution effect
(producers)
Energy market effect
Composition effect
Growth effect
Scale effect
Labour supply effect
Disinvestment effect

Sources: Own elaboration based upon [21,71,93].
Note: This list is not exhaustive, the mechanisms are not necessarily additive; and each mechanism may either increase or reduce economy-wide energy consumption
depending upon the particular situation. The relative importance of these mechanisms will also vary from one context to another and from one type of energy efficiency
improvement to another.
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Appendix C. Limitations of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models
• Market and behavioural assumptions: CGE models rely upon standard but frequently unrealistic assumptions about economic behaviour, such as
market equilibrium, utility maximization, perfect competition and constant returns to scale.
• Functional Forms: CGE models simulate producer (consumer) behaviour through ‘nested’ constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
(utility) functions. These are chosen for their computational convenience, but rely on the assumption that inputs (commodities) are ‘separable’:
that is, the elasticity of substitution between inputs (commodities) within a nest is unaffected by the level or price of inputs (commodities) outside
the nest [55]. This assumption typically lacks empirical support. Model results are sensitive to the assumed nesting structure, but this varies from
one model to another and there is no consensus on where energy inputs should be located within this structure [129]. For example, capital (K),
labour (L) and energy (E) inputs could be nested as: (KL)E, (KE)L or (LE)K.
• Calibration: CGE models are calibrated to a social accounting matrix for the base year, with adjustments being made to the data to ensure equi
librium. But since markets are not in equilibrium, the choice of base year can influence the results. For example, if a particular sector is depressed in
the base year, the share of profits in the output of the sector would be low.
• Parameters: CGE parameter values are either determined through calibration, taken from the empirical literature or assumed. But the process of
compiling parameter values lacks transparency, and the cited empirical studies may use different functional forms and parameter definitions to
those used in CGE models, as well as applying to different sectors, time-periods and/or levels of aggregation [55]. Model results are sensitive to
these parameter values, but they vary widely from one model to another. Sensitivity tests are increasingly used, but are typically confined to only a
small number of relevant parameters.
• Static versus dynamic: Static CGE models simulate equilibrium states of the economy and compare the initial and final equilibrium after some
exogenous shock, such as an improvement in energy efficiency. This approach neglects the costs and time taken for the economy to adjust. For
example, transport and building infrastructures take longer to adjust than other types of capital equipment. Dynamic CGE models explicitly model
the adjustment process, with the capital stock in any year being dependent upon investment in the previous year. This overcomes some of the
limitations of static models, but dynamic models are more complex and computationally intensive. Also, both types of model have difficulties
simulating structural change and the emergence of new technologies and sectors.
• Model closure: The choice of which variables to set exogenously is termed the model closure. For example, some CGE modellers hold employment
and the trade balance fixed while others allow these to vary. Of particular importance is whether capital is fixed or adjustable within individual
sectors and regions, and how wages and labour supply adjust to changes in economic activity. These assumptions can have a major influence on the
results.
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Masson-Delmotte V, Zhai P, Pörtner HO, Roberts D, Skea J, Shukla PR, et al. IPCC,
2018: summary for policymakers. In: Global warming of 1.5◦ C. An IPCC Special
Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5◦ C above pre-industrial levels and
related global greenhouse gas emission pathways. the context of strengthening
the global; 2018.
Patterson MG. What is energy efficiency? Energy Pol 1996;24(5):377–90.
Cleveland CJ, Kaufmann RK, Stern DI. Aggregation and the role of energy in the
economy. Ecol Econ 2000 Feb;32(2):301–17.
Fullerton D, Ta CL. Costs of energy efficiency mandates can reverse the sign of
rebound: CESifo Working Paper no. 7550. CESifo Work Pap 2019;(April):1–34.
Saunders HD. Historical evidence for energy efficiency rebound in 30 US sectors
and a toolkit for rebound analysts. Technol Forecast Soc Change 2013 Sep;80(7):
1317–30.
Sorrell S. Energy substitution, technical change and rebound effects. Energies
2014 Apr 29;7(5):2850–73.
Berndt ER. Aggregate energy, efficiency, and productivity measurement. Annu
Rev Energy 1978;3:225–73.
Sorrell S, Dimitropoulos J, Sommerville M. Empirical estimates of the direct
rebound effect: a review. Energy Pol 2009 Apr;37(4):1356–71.
Dimitropoulos A, Oueslati W, Sintek C. The rebound effect in road transport: a
meta-analysis of empirical studies. Energy Econ 2018;75:163–79.
Gillingham K, Rapson D, Wagner G. The rebound effect and energy efficiency
policy. Rev Environ Econ Pol 2016;10(1):68–88.
Guerra AI, Sancho F. Rethinking economy-wide rebound measures: an unbiased
proposal. Energy Pol 2010;38(11):6684–94.
Turner K, Hanley N. Energy efficiency, rebound effects and the environmental
Kuznets Curve. Energy Econ 2011 Sep;33(5):709–20.
Bruns SB, Moneta A, Stern DI. Macroeconomic time-series evidence that energy
efficiency improvements do not save energy. 2019. CAMA Working Paper 21/
2019 February 2019.
Tsao JY, Saunders HD, Creighton JR, Coltrin ME, Simmons JA. Solid-state
lighting: an energy-economics perspective. J Phys D Appl Phys 2010 Sep 8;43
(35):354001.
Orea L, Llorca M, Filippini M. A new approach to measuring the rebound effect
associated to energy efficiency improvements: an application to the US residential
energy demand. Energy Econ 2015;49:599–609.

[65] Chitnis M, Sorrell S. Living up to expectations: estimating direct and indirect
rebound effects for UK households. Energy Econ 2015;52:S100–16.
[66] Chitnis M, Sorrell S, Druckman A, Firth SK, Jackson T. Turning lights into flights :
estimating direct and indirect rebound effects for UK households. Energy Pol
2013;55:234–50.
[67] Chitnis M, Sorrell S, Druckman A, Firth SK, Jackson T. Who rebounds most?
Estimating direct and indirect rebound effects for different UK socioeconomic
groups. Ecol Econ 2014;106:12–32.
[68] Thomas BA, Azevedo IL. Estimating direct and indirect rebound effects for U.S.
households with input–output analysis Part 1: theoretical framework. Ecol Econ
2013;86:199–210.
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